Abstract. We present a novel practical algorithm that given a lattice basis b1, ..., bn finds in O(n 2 (
Introduction and Summary
History. The set of all linear combinations with integer coefficients of a set of linearly independent vectors b 1 , ..., b n ∈ R d is a lattice of dimension n. The problem of finding a shortest, nonzero lattice vector is a landmark problem in complexity theory. This problem is polynomial time for fixed dimension n due to [LLL82] and is NP-hard for varying n [E81, A98, M98] . No efficient algorithm is known to find very short vectors in high dimensional lattices. Improving the known methods has a direct impact on the cryptographic security of many schemes, see [NS00] for a surview.
Approximating the shortest lattice vector to within an approximation factor ( apfa for short ) c means to find a nonzero lattice vector with at most c-times the minimal possible length. We consider integer lattices of dimension n in Z n with a given lattice basis consisting of integer vectors of Euclidean length 2 O(n) . The LLL-algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra, Lovász [LLL82] achieves for arbitrary ε > 0 an apfa (
n/2 in O(n 5 ) steps using integers of bit length O(n 2 ). This algorithm repeatedly constructs short bases in two-dimensional lattices, the two-dimensional problem was already solved by Gauss. The recent segment LLL-reduction of KS02] achieves the same apfa (
within O(n 3 log n) steps. Finding very short lattice vectors requires additional search beyond LLLtype reduction. The algorithm of Kannan [K83] finds the shortest lattice vector in time n O(n) by a diligent exhaustive search, see [H85] for an n n 2 +o(n) time algorithm. The recent probabilistic sieve algorithm of [AKS01] runs in 2 O(n) average time and space, but is impractical as the exponent O(n) is about 30 n. Schnorr [S87] has generalized the LLL-algorithm in various ways that repeatedly construct short bases of k-dimensional lattices of dimension k ≥ 2. While 2k-reduction [S87] runs in O(n 3 k k+o(k) +n 4 ) time, the stronger BKZ-reduction [S87, SE91] is quite efficient for k ≤ 20 but lacks a proven time bound. LLL-reduction is the case k = 1 of 2k-reduction.
Our novel method randomly samples short lattice vectors in high dimensional sublattices, and inserts by a global transform short vectors into the lattice basis. It remarkably differs from previous LLL-type reductions that locally transform the lattice basis by reducing small blocks of consecutive basis vectors. The new method applies to lattice bases for which the associated orthogonal basis satisfies two conditions, RA and GSA, defined in Section 2. These conditions are natural for worst case lattice bases and also play in Ajtai's recent worst case analysis [A02] of Schnorr's 2k-reduction. Our new method is practical and space efficient and outperforms all previous algorithms.
Sampling reduction inserts a short vector found by random sampling into the basis, BKZ-reduces the new basis and iterates the procedure with the resulting basis. We observed sporadic big jumps of progress during BKZ-reduction, jumps that are difficult to analyze. We study the progress of the new method in attacks on the GGH-cryptosysytem [GGH97] where we build on our previous experience. We report in detail, we believe that our findings extend beyond GGH to general applications. We expect that the new algorithms lower the security of lattice based cryptosystems.
2. simple birthday The shown time bounds must be completed by a constant factor and an additive term O(n 4 ) covering LLL-type reduction. The integer k, 2 ≤ k ≤ n/2, can be freely chosen. The entry c under space/n means that c+O(n) lattice vectors, consisting of c · n + O(n 2 ) integers, must be stored. The original LLL-algorithm uses integers of bit length O(n 2 ) required to compute the orthogonal basis in exact integer arithmetic. However, by computing the orthogonal basis in approximate rational arithmetic (floating point arithmetic in practice) LLL-type reduction can be done in O(n 5 ) arithmetic steps using integers of bit length O(n). The proven analysis of Schnorr [S88] induces diligent steps for error correction, but simple methods of scaling are sufficient in practice [KS01b] .
Sampling Reduction repeats the algorithm SHORT that is shorter than b 1 . Simple birthday sampling for t = 1 further decreases the apfa achievable in a given time to its square root, but its practicability hinges on the required space. Method 4 produces 2k-reduced bases [S87, Theorem 3 .1], and proceeds via shortest lattice vectors in dimension 2k while Koy's primal-dual method 3 repeatedly constructs shortest lattice vectors in dimension k [K00] . The apfa's of Methods 3 and 4 assume the realistic bound γ k ≤ k/6 for k ≥ 24 for the Her-
We let
Let λ 1 denote the length of the shortest nonzero lattice vector of a given
For simplicity, let all given lattice bases be bounded so that max i b i = 2 O(n) . Our time bounds count arithmetic steps using integers of bit length O(n).
Random Sampling of Short Vectors
Let L be a lattice with given basis b 1 , . . . , b n . As a lattice vector b = n j=1 µ j b j has length b 2 = n j=1 µ 2 j b j 2 the search for short lattice vectors naturally comprises two steps:
The various reduction algorithms differ by the choice of . . , b n ) is to high. Surprisingly, random sampling in high dimension n−j +1 outperforms exhaustive search in low dimension k. Here we introduce random sampling for j = 1, the algorithm ESHORT of Section 3 uses a straightforward extension to j ≥ 1. Random sampling for j = 1 searches short
We analyse this idea assuming that the lengths b 1 2 , ..., b n 2 are close to a geometric series.
The Sampling Method. Let 1 ≤ u < n be constant. Given a lattice basis
There are at least 2 u distinct lattice vectors b of this form. The sampling algorithm (SA) below generates a single vector b in time O(n 2 ). The subsequent algorithm SHORT samples distinct vectors via SA until a vector b is found that is shorter than b 1 . The choice of µ n = 1 implies that
The coefficient µ i is updated (n − i)-times. This leads to a nearly uniform distribution of the µ i , in particular for small i, which is crucial for our method. Note that SA is deterministic, the random sampling is "pseudo-random" in a weak heuristic sense. without achieving equality. Importantly, our conclusions under GSA also hold for approximations where
Randomness Assumption
], e.g. smaller than 0.01 for Theorems 1 and 2. We have tested the GSA for the public GGH-bases according to the cryptosystem of [GGH97] . After either Koy's primal-dual reduction or after BKZreduction with block size 20 these bases closely approximate GSA and RA. The GSA-behavior is significantly better after BKZ-reduction than after primal-dual reduction. Lattice bases that are not reduced by an LLL-type reduction usually have bad GSA-behavior.
Under the GSA the values log 2 ( b i 2 / b i 2 ) for i = 1, ..., n are on a straight line. For lattice bases that are BKZ-reduced these values closely approximate a line. Figure 1 shows a GGH-basis generated according to the GGH-cryptosystem [GGH97] after various reductions and a final BKZ-reduction with block size 20. We associate with a basis b 1 , ..., b n the quotients
.., n, q := q n . As apfa ≤ q (−n+1)/2 the goal of the reduction is to increase q. Of course our reduction problem gets easier for smaller n and smaller q.
If GSA does not hold we have that q i = q for some i. Select i as to maximize |q i − q|. We transform the given reduction problem into smaller, easier problems with bases that better approximate the GSA.
If q , thus either q i < q or q i < q.
In either case we solve an easier lattice problem with a smaller q-value and a smaller dimension. Our procedure decreases |q − q i | providing a basis that better approximates a geometric series. Therefore, lattice bases of the same q-value get harder the better they approximate a geometric series.
Under RA that event has probability
We study the probability that b 2 < b 1 2 holds under RA and the conditions (1), (2). 
Proof. By Lemma 1 we have under (1), (2) the mean value
This proves the claim as 4/(q − 1) ≥ 1, and (2) holds with probability q ( Remark. 1. SHORT improves under GSA and RA an apfa (
) average time by a factor √ 0.99 for k ≥ 24 and n ≥ 3k + k ln k. 2. We can replace in Theorems 1 and 2 the constant 6 by an arbitrary δ < 12 since The observed 9% length reduction via 2 12 sampled vectors is close to the value predicted under RA and GSA by our refined analysis. All experiments have been done on a 1700 MHz, 512 MB RAM PC using the software packages of NTL 5.1 and GMP 4.0.1.
Refined Analysis of SHORT. The inequalities (2) (2) by allowing a few larger coeffi-
Sampling Reduction
ESHORT is an extension of SHORT that samples 2 Practical Experiments. With the above method C. Tobias has reconstructed the secret GGH-basis of the GGH-cryptosystem [GGH97] in dimension n = 160 and n = 180. This has been done by plain lattice reduction without improving the GGH-lattice by algebraic transforms as has been done by Nguyen [N99] . The secret GGH-basis was reconstructed in 40 -80 minutes for dimension n = 160 within 4 iterations, and in about 9 hours for n = 180 using 20 iterations. This was not possible by previous lattice reduction algorithms. 2 12 to 2 17 vectors have been sampled per iteration. BKZ-reduction was done by the BKZ-algorithm of NTL for block size 20. Usually ESHORT succeeds with j ≤ 10.
Interestingly, BKZ-reduction of the new basis
. . , b n−1 triggers sporadic big jumps of progress. Typically the length of the shortest vector is decreased by a factor 1.2 -1.5 but occasionally by a factor up to 9. Sometimes the shortest lattice vector was found at an early stage. All experiments have been done on a 1700 MHz, 512 MB RAM PC using the software packages of NTL 5.1 and GMP 4.0.1.
What triggers the big jumps during BKZ-reduction ? When ESHORT finds a pair (b, j), so that 
General Birthday Sampling
The birthday heuristic is a well known method that given a list of m bit integers, drawn uniformly at random, finds a collision of the given integers in O(2 m/2 ) average time. The method can easily be extended to find two random k-bit integers having a small difference, less than 2 k−m , O(2 m/2 ) time. We extend the birthday method from integers to lattice vectors, we extend random sampling to birthday sampling. Let Q denote the set of rational numbers, let m, t ≥ 1 be integers.
Wagner 
We extend 
We extend our method from rational numbers in [− time, and even in 2k ( Conclusion. Theorem 1 shows that the new method greatly improves the known algorithms for finding very short lattice vectors. This lowers the security of all lattice based cryptographic schemes. Simple birthday sampling may further decrease that security but its practicability hinges on the required space.
